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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
TORTS-APPLICATION OF DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION OF FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Federal Tort Claims Act' is a waiver of sovereign immunity to
suit, making the United States liable for the torts of its employees
committed within the scope of their employment, "under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. ' 2 This language is very broad, but the scope of the
act is limited by several exceptions. The one with which this article
is concerned is commonly known as the discretionary function exception,
and reads as follows:
"The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim.., based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."3
The language used in this section seems to be clear and unequivocal,
but nevertheless a certain amount of confusion has arisen concerning its
application. The section seems to mean, simply, that the United States
will not be liable for the torts of its employees when such torts are
committed in the exercise of a discretionary function or duty. Ob-
viously, however, to apply the exception to every act or omission of a
government employee which in any sense of the word might be termed
discretionary would defeat the very purpose of the act. An example of
the confusion existing appears in the case of Olson v. United States,4
in which the court said:
"When flood waters are to be released and how much water
is to be released certainly calls for the exercise of judgment; in
other words, the performance of a discretionary function."
The apparent meaning of this sentence is that the terms 'exercise of
judgment' and 'discretionary function' are synonomous. If this were
true the waiver of sovereign immunity would be extremely limited in
scope. It is seldom that an employee is not to some degree exercising
his judgment. Fortunately, the courts have not interpreted the dis-
cretionary function exception so liberally.5
128 U.S.C.A. secs. 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2674-
2680. (1948).
228 U.S.C.A. § 346(b) (1948).328 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1948).
40lson v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 150 (D.C. N.Dak., 1950).5 The Supreme Court in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 17 S.Ct. 399 (1951)
indicated that the FTCA should be liberally construed. It would seem to
follow that if the act itself is to be liberally construed the exceptions to it
should be strictly construed.
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The problem lies in attempting to determine the exact scope of the
term 'discretionary function.' The term is n6t such as to be capable of
a definition which would fit every fact situation which may arise, and
the courts have not attempted to give it such a definition. The definitions
given are generally to the effect that a person possessing a discretionary
power is not under compulsion, but cannot act capriciously or arbi-
trarily." Nevertheless, in view of the congressional intent in enacting
the exception and in view of the judicial application of the exception to
date, it should be possible to arrive at a somewhat clearer idea of how
the exception has been applied and how it will be applied in the future.
For the purposes of clarity and simplicity in presentation the problem
will be treated as consisting of two questions: First; how far does the
discretion extend when it does exist? Second; when does a discretion-
ary function exist, or when are functions discretionary?
How far the discretion extends where it has been found that
discretion exists can best be shown by a comparison between two cases
decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The first action was
based on the alleged negligence of the United States Army in failing to
provide prompt medical service for the wife of an army officer.7 The
court held there that under the controlling regulations, which provided
for medical services for servicemen's families whenever practicable,
there was no absolute duty to provide prompt medical service. Con-
sequently the decision as to whether or not to provide medical services
was a discretionary function, and the action was dismissed under the
discretionary function exception. The second action, however, was
based on the negligence of the employees of an army hospital in
administering a harmful substance instead of a spinal anesthetic to a
soldier's wife, after she had been admitted for treatment, This time
the court held that whatever discretion was involved was exercised in
admitting the patient to the hospital, and having once admitted her there
was a duty to give her proper attendance and treatment. A similar
ruling resulted from an action for damages suffered when the plaintiff
received treatment for an ear infection in a veterans hospital, but by
mistake carbolic acid was poured in his ear.9 Here again it was held
that whatever discretion was involved was exercised in deciding to give
plaintiff treatment, and that there was no discretion involved in the
actual giving of the treatment.
These cases indicate that the discretion mentioned in the exception
is only a discretion in making certain decisions or determinations, and
that there is no discretion in "acting upon them and carrying them out.
6 See WORDS AND PHRASES for judicial interpretations of the term 'discretion'.
7 Denny v. United States, 171 F. 2d 365 (5th Cir., 1948).
8 Costley v. United States, 181 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir., 1950).
9 Dishman v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 567 (D.C. Md., 1950).
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In other words, negligence in making a decision which is a discretionary
function is only an abuse of discretion, but once that decision has been
made, any further negligence in acting upon it is an actionable tort
giving rise to a cause of action against the United States. The exception
does not extend to the mere details of carrying out the decision since
those are not discretionary functions.
This conclusion is supported by the case of Coates v. United States.0
That was an action to recover for damages to plaintiff's land caused by
flooding, which in turn was caused by the changing of the course of the
Missouri River in connection with a federal flood control project. The
action was dismissed under the discretionary function exception, but the
court noted in the last paragraph of the decision that the negligence
charged in the complaint referred to the exercise of legislative and
executive functions which sanctioned the river project and discretionary
functions which controlled it. The complaint did not charge negligence
in some mere job of work involved in carrying on the river project. It
appears to be necessary to plead specific acts of negligence.
In the Olson case" the plaintiff attempted to plead specific acts of
negligence but lost the action anyway. The United States Fish and
Wildlife Service had opened dam gates and released water at a time
when the river channel was blocked by ice and snow. As a result
plaintiff's farm and personalty were damaged. The complaint con-
tained allegations that the United States, through its agents, did willfully
and intentionally open the gates, that such agents were negligent, and
that there was a lack of ordinary care and diligence. The court held that
pleading negligence in specific acts would not defeat the application of
the exception where it clearly appeared that the acts complained of were
based on the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary-function or duty. The court does seem to have adopted
the rule, however, that there is no discretion to be negligent in carrying
out the decisions or determinations in which the discretion was exer-
cised, by holding that the employees did not open the dam gates negli-
gently; they only abused their discretion as to when to open them. The
distinction is not easy to express, but it seems to be important when
pleading a cause of action under the FTCA if the action is not to be
dismissed under the discretionary function exception.
After actually pleading specifc acts of negligence the plaintiff still
has the burden of proving them. In Boyce v. United States.2 the action
was for the recovery of damages to property resulting from dynamite
blasting by the United States in deepening the Mississippi River channel
in aid of navigation. The action was dismissed as to the count alleging
10 Coates v. United States, 181 F. 2d 816, 19 A.L.R. 2d 840 (8th Cir., 1950).
21 Supra, note 4.
12 Boyce v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 866 (D.C. Iowa, 1950).
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specific acts of negligence because the plaintiff failed to sustain the
burden of proving them, and as to the general count because the dis-
cretionary function exception applied.
An interesting point brought out in this case is that liability did not
necessarily depend on proof of negligence, since under the applicable
Iowa law there was absolute liability for damage caused by blasting.
Only damages and causation had to be proved. However, the court held
that the Chief of Engineers exercised his discretion in approving all the
details of the plans for blasting, and therefore the discretion extended to
all those details. Since the fact of blasting was the only proved cause of
the damages, the claim was based on the exercise of a discretionary
function. The court held that the result might have been different if
the agents and employees actually discharging or detonating the dyna-
mite had deviated in so doing from the discretionary plan approved by
the Chief of Engineers.
The answer to the first question as to how far the discretion extends
can now be stated. The discretion is limited to the principal decision or
determination; it does not extend to negligence in the minor details and
determinations made as incidents thereto. The original or principal de-
cision is a discretionary function, but the minor ones generally are not.
Negligence in making the discretionary decision is merely an abuse of
discretion, but negligence thereafter is an actionable tort. In the Boyce
case the discretion did extend to the minor details, but only because they
were decided upon by the person having the discretion. Also, it does not
appear in that case that there was any negligence involved in either de-
ciding upon or carrying out the minor details of the plan.
Although the discretion, when discretion exists, is limited to the
principal decision or determination, not all principal decisions are dis-
cretionary. In other words, discretion does not alvays exist even in the
decision or determination. The next question then is, when are the
principal decisions or determinations discretionary, or as stated earlier,
when does a discretionary function exist? The answer to this question
will depend upon the congressional intent. House Report Number 1287,
79th Congress is quite enlightening on that intent, and states:
"This is a highly important exception, intended to preclude
any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize suits
for damages against the government growing out of an authorized
activity, such as a flood control or irrigation project, where no
negligence on the part of any government agent is shown, and
the only ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct
by a private individual would be tortious .... 13
This portion of the report indicates that the exception was not
13 H.Rept. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., (1945) p. 5.
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intended to be used to defeat suits based on negligence, at least in some
cases. The courts have taken the view, however, as has been seen by the
cases previously cited, that if the negligence involved is merely a negli-
gent exercise of the discretionary function it is just an abuse of dis-
cretion and the exception still applies. On the other hand, if the
negligent act is committed after the discretion has been exhausted the
exception will not apply.
The report is more important for its indication that the exception
was intended to apply where the government is engaged in an authorized
activity, specifically mentioning flood control and irrigation projects.
This indicates that not all government activities were intended to be
included within the discretionary function exception, but is of little help
in determining just which ones are to be included since it does not say-
what is meant by an authorized activity. The report gives a few more
examples of the type of claims which were intended to be barred by the
exception. Those are claims against regulatory agencies, including
specifically the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Treasury Department. Claims against the regu-
latory agencies were to be barred by the exception whether or not
negligence is alleged to have been involved.
"However, the common law torts of employees of regulatory
agencies would be included within the scope of the bill (the
FTCA) to the same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies."'14
Upon reading this report two distinctions become apparent. First,
certain authorized activities were to be excepted from the waiver of
sovereign immunity provided that no negligence is shown, but claims
arising from the activities of regulatory agencies were intended to be
excepted whether or not negligence is alleged or shown. The second
distinction is that although the torts of regulatory agencies are excluded
from the FTCA by the discretionary function exception, the torts of
employees of regulatory agencies are not excluded, but are to be included
to the same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies. The implication
is that torts of nonregulatory agencies are not excluded from the FTCA
unless they are authorized activities, and then only if no negligence is
involved.
To date it has not been necessary for the courts to make these dis-
tinctions, since in none of the reported cases wherein the discretionary
function exception has been applied or sought to be applied has the
claim been based upon the activities of a regulatory agency. The only
question which has had to be answered was whether or not the claim
was based upon the exercise of a discretionary function. In order to




discretionary functions it will be necessary to examine the cases in
which the application of the discretionary function exception was an
issue.
Generally, in the cases in which it was found that the claim was
based on the exercise of a discretionary function the discretion involved
decisions of major interest to the public, and several of them fall within
the class of flood control or irrigation projects which, as shown by the
House Report quoted earlier herein, were intended to be excluded from
the FTCA by the exception. Thus, in the Coates case' 5 the act of the
government in changing the course of the Missouri River, and in the
Boyce case', the act of the government in deepening the channel of the
Mississippi River, were held to be discretionary functions. In several
other cases arising out of government flood control projects the actions
were also dismissed under the discretionary function exception.17
In other actions it was held that the claim was based on the exercise
of a discretionary function because the damages resulted from the
determinations of some important government official, such as the
Secretary of the Interior. One example is an action arising when geese
from a federal refuge damaged and destroyed plaintiff's crops.'8 The
complaint alleged that the cause of the damage was negligence on the
part of the United States in prohibiting the hunting of migratory
waterfowl. The court held that in determining whether migratory
waterfowl might be hunted and killed in any particular year, the Secre-
tary of the Interior performs a discretionary function, and dismissed
the action.
In still other actions a discretionary function was found to exist due
to the regulations or orders under which an official was acting. Thus, in
the Denny case' 9 the hospital officials were found to be exercising a
discretionary function because the regulations provided for medical
services for servicemen's families whenever practicable. The term
'whenever practicable' was held to create a discretionary function.
Similarly, in a suit for losses suffered by reason of plaintiff's coal mine
not being operated after it had been taken over by the Secretary of the
Interior under an executive order of the President, it was held that the
executive order gave the Secretary the discretion to operate or not
operate the mines.
20
However, in Oman v. United States2' it was held that the Federal
15 Supra, note 10.
16 Supra, note 12.
:'-Thomas v. United States, 81 F.Supp. 881 (D.C. Mo., 1949) ; North v. United
States, 94 F.Supp. 824 (D.C. Utah, 1950); Lauterbach v. United States, 95
F.Supp. 479 (D.C. Wash., 1951).
18 Sickman v. United States, 184 F. 2d 616 (7th Cir., 1950).
19 Supra, note 7.
20 Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F.Supp. 124 (D.C. Iowa, 1949).
21 Oman v. United States, 179 F. 2d 738 (10th Cir., 1949).
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Range Code did not grant the government employees any discretion to
refuse to cancel the grazing permits of plaintiff's predecessors. The
court also said:
"No government employee is granted the discretion whether
or not he shall induce or incite third persons to interfere with
exclusive rights or privileges granted by the United States."
The actions there complained of were intentional, not merely negli-
gence.2 Whether or not this ruling will be extended to apply to all other
intentional torts which are not excluded by the other exceptions to the
FTCA remains to be seen.
23
An attempt was made in the case of Toledo v. United States 4 to lay
down a rule limiting the scope of the term 'discretionary function'. The
facts of that case were that due to internal rot a large tree fell upon and
crushed plaintiff's automobile while it was parked on the grounds of the
United States Experimental Station at Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, in an
area used for automobile parking and within the control of the ex-
perimental station. The tree was the subject of certain experiments
being carried on by the experimental station. It was held that the course
to be pursued in experimenting with the tree and whether or not to
continue experimentation was a discretionary function.
In the decision the court laid down the rule that the discretionary
function exception was to be limited to acts which are governmental in
their nature. This rule may be of some help if expanded somewhat, but
simply as stated by the court it just creates the secondary problem of
which acts of employees or activities of the government are govern-
mental in their nature. The activities of states and municipalities have
been quite frequently classified, for the purpose of determining their
liability for the torts of their agents, into two categories; those which
are governmental functions and those which are proprietary functions.2 5
That classification has seldom been made, however, in the case of
activities of the federal government, since prior to the enactment of the
FTCA and its predecessors the federal government was not liable for
the torts of its employees regardless of the type of activity in which it
was engaged. The rule may be of some help, however, if the courts will
consider the classifications heretofore applied to state and municipal
activities as applicable also to activities of the United States. If that
was done there would then be judicial precedents for classifying nearly
22 The problem arises whether intentional torts are within the scope of employ-
ment. This problem was not solved in this case but the court indicated that
the mere fact that the acts were unauthorized would not remove them from
the scope of employment.
2328 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) lists eleven intentional torts which are excepted from
the waiver of sovereign immunity.
4 Toledo v. United States, 95 F.Supp. 838 (D.C. Puerto Rico, 1951).




any type of activity in which the federal government may engage.28
Even applying the very broad but general rule of classification, that
those activities are governmental if for the benefit of the public as a
whole and that all the others are proprietary, would be of some help and
would serve to restrict the discretionary function exception within
reasonable limits.
Although the courts prior to the Toledo case did not expressly limit
the discretionary function exception to activities of the United States
of a governmental nature, they seem to have quite uniformly applied the
exception only to activities which were intended for the benefit of the
public in general and thus could be said to be of a governmental nature.
Examples of this are the cases arising out of flood control projects, im-
provement of navigable rivers under the commerce clause, the emer-
gency operations of coal mines, and the protection of migratory water-
fowl. An apparent exception to this is the case of Ure v. United States.2 7
In that case the court held that the operation by the United States of an
irrigation system was not a discretionary function, without giving much
reasoning for the holding. The decision is in conformance, however,
with the governmental function principle, since the court held that the
United States was acting as a common carrier of water, and state
agencies and municipalities acting as common carriers of water have
been held to be acting in proprietary capacities. 2 Consequently, it could
be said by analogy that the United States was acting in a proprietary
capacity in the Ure case, and therefore liable under the FTCA as would
be an individual in the same circumstances. That, at least, is the effect
of the ruling.
Although the court in the Toledo case laid down a rule which may
be helpful in the future in applying the discretionary function exception,
its decision on the facts is not entirely satisfactory, probably because the
facts themselves are not very clear. Apparently the cause of action was
based on negligence but the decision does not show where the negligence
lay. If the negligence was involved in deciding to continue experimen-
tation with the tree, then it seems to be more logical. It hardly seems
that such a decision would be a governmental function as being intended
for the benefit of the public as a whole, but states have been held to be
acting in a governmental capacity when operating agricultural experi-
mental stations.2 9 On the other hand, if the negligence lay in the lack of
ordinary care after having decided to continue the experiments, it would
seem that following the precedent of the Costley case the court should
26 Ibid.
27 Ure v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 779 (D.C. Oregon, 1950).
28Home Owner's Loan Corporation v. Logan City, 97 Utah 235, 92 P. 2d 346
(1939); accord, Newman v. Bitter Root Irrigation District. 95 Mont. 521,
28 P. 2d 195 (1933).29 M Lorgan v. State, 170 S.W. 2d 648 (1942).
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have ruled that the discretion was exercised and exhausted in deciding
to continue experimentation with the tree, and that there was no dis-
cretion to be negligent in carrying on such experimentation.
The recent case of Ellison v. United States30 is perhaps the best
example of limiting the discretionary function exception to activities of
the United States in its governmental nature. The complaint alleged that
the United States, acting in its proprietary capacity and as successor in
interest to certain ranch lands, unlawfully diverted part of the water
supply of a stream in violation of a court order. The United States
attempted to have the action dismissed under the discretionary function
exception, but the court held that there was no discretionary function
involved since the United States was acting in a proprietary capacity.
The diversion was not part of a public work and not in the public
interest. This distinguished the action from the Coates case and similar
cases in that they generally were concerned with acts or omissions in-
volving the exercise of judgment or discretion having to do with great
projects and matters of public interest.
The answer to the second question presented, as to when functions
are discretionary, appears to be that functions are discretionary when
carried on for the public interest, or where the discretion is more or less
expressly given by a regulation or order, or when the function is part of
the duties of a high government official. As has been seen, the two most
recent cases have shown a tendency to limit the exception to acts which
are governmental in their nature, or in the public interest. This tendency
should be approved as it will enable attorneys to more clearly understand
when the exception will be applied, and will be more in consonance with
the congressional intent to waive sovereign immunity to suit for tort.
LAWRENCE KAmINSKI
30 Ellison v. United States, 98 F.Supp. 20 (D.C. Nev., 1951).
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